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ABSTRACT 
Many of those close to the Congressional legislative process seem 
to view the short titles of bills as “branding” rather than official legal 
instruments. In fact, this may be one of the reasons that some short titles 
for bills and laws have become tendentious and overly aspirational. 
This is problematic for such titles, as they are formally recognized by 
their inscription into federal law, and thus transcend their “branding” 
purposes, thereby putting the legal status of short titles in an awkward 
juxtaposition. By stripping away all of the current legal barriers that 
would technically negate such a prospect, this Article considers whether 
contemporary short bills titles would pass the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission’s (“FTC”) deceptive practice scrutiny. Relying on three 
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main pieces of evidence (the FTC Policy Statement on Deception, the 
FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, and the 
landmark Kraft, Inc. v. FTC decision), this Article demonstrates that 
many congressional short titles do employ deceptive advertising 
practices and would be actionable under FTC standards. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As people progress throughout their day, they are knowingly and 
unknowingly engulfed in a myriad of rules, regulations, and laws from a 
number of law-making institutions at many levels. It just so happens 
that mailing a letter, swiping a credit card, depositing a monthly pay 
check, dropping the children off at school, logging into an email 
account, or just picking up groceries for the week, among a multitude of 
other daily activities, are actions that are directly or indirectly legislated 
by federal, state and local governments. Many of these legislated 
functions are government services (i.e. postal, educational, etc.), while 
others are regulations of one sort or another (food and drug labeling, 
financial regulation, etc.). 
Most federal laws and regulations have one distinct origin: the 
United States Congress. It is here that legislators propose bills that they 
try to sell not only to one another, but also to organizations, interest 
groups, journalists, and perhaps most importantly, the American public, 
so that such measures will pass. And federal bills are unregulated in 
terms of what lawmakers choose to name their bills while legislators are 
in the midst of ‘selling’ these proposals.
1
 No matter what members of 
Congress end up naming legislation, one thing is certain: the impact that 
federal law has on the American public is immense. Not enforcing any 
type of official guidelines or recommendations for accurately carrying 
out one of the most basic legislative functions—inscribing short bill 
titles—seems inadequate and potentially damaging to U.S. consumers 
(including citizens that encounter and interact with these laws). Though 
it likely would never happen, we thought it would be interesting to 
consider whether many current short bill titles would pass U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”) scrutiny in terms of 
deceptive advertising practices. Since Congress provides no standards 
 
1 See generally, OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL, U.S. H.R., 104TH CONG., HOUSE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE, §321(a) (1995), 
http://www.house.gov/legcoun/pdf/draftstyle.pdf. (The Manual provides little in the way of 
recommendations for short titles. What it does suggest, however, is to keep such titles short. 
However, these recommendations are not compulsory, and are rarely followed). 
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for such titles in terms of deception, we thought we would look to 
another source, the FTC. This Article will first provide some 
background about bill titles in the U.S. Congress and explain the 
problem of tendentious, misleading and deceptive titles more 
thoroughly by using a few specific bills as case studies. The Article then 
investigates how FTC standards might apply when assessing such 
legislative titles by examining the FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 
the Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, and the 
landmark Kraft, Inc. v. FTC decision. Ultimately, it finds that the 
myriad of tendentious and promotional congressional short titles would 
be problematic under many of these commercial standards. 
II. PROBLEMATIC CONGRESSIONAL TITLES 
Legislating in the United States Congress can be an entertaining 
affair. This statement is particularly true in relation to some of the short 
bill titles inscribed on official congressional statutes. Throughout the 
years these titles have become increasingly evocative (USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001
2
 and Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009
3
), 
humorous (CAN SPAM Act
4
 and Credit CARD Act
5
), and all-
encompassing (Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
6
 No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001
7
). Essentially, they have become an endless 
game for legislators, as the more evocative or memorable the short title, 
the better.
8
 Some acts can provide us with a sense of CALM,
9
 remind us 
 
2 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
3 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632. 
4 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) 
Act of 2003 Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003). 
5 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). Located inside the acronym of that Act are the words 
“accountability” and “responsibility,” two words that contrast mightily with the notion of 
credit, and especially credit cards, making the moniker quite humorous. 
6 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
7 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001). 
8 Walter J. Oleszek, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS, 93 (8th Ed. 
2011); See generally, R. Douglas Arnold, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); 
(forthcoming) Brian Christopher Jones, Processes, Standards & Politics: Drafting Short 
Titles in the Westminster Parliament, Scottish Parliament and US Congress 25(1) FLA. J. 
INT’L L. (2013). 
9 Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation (CALM) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-311, 
124 Stat. 3294 (2010). 
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that America COMPETES
10
 or PROTECT[s] Our Children
11
 and 
provides research for PREEMIE[s],
12
 or announces that it is okay to 
drink SAFETEA.
13
 
It appears, based on interviews discussed below, as if no matter 
how outlandish or evocative a short title may be, if the bill is approved 
by both chambers and signed by the President, the short title is inscribed 
as federal law. Therefore, the political branding devices that 
Congressional members use when bills are traveling through the 
legislative process are making their way into U.S. law. This provides a 
strange juxtaposition for such titles, as they are employed to serve two 
very different purposes: first, as branding devices in the legislative 
process; and second, as elements of statutory law. It may come as no 
surprise that many individuals close to the legislative process view them 
as branding devices rather than law. 
This perspective was confirmed when co-author Jones performed 
interviews with a number of Congressional staffers and other political 
insiders on the status of short bill titles.
14
 Common reactions included: 
that they were merely “branding;”
15
 served a “branding purpose;”
16
 were 
useful “from a branding perspective;”
17
 were used for “press reasons or 
marketing reasons;”
18
 were “marketing strateg[ies];”
19
 and that some 
members would “put a little more effort into coming up with a clever 
short title, or . . . brand-worthy short title” if they deem it necessary.
20
 
Others noted that “there’s so much more that you can do with a name 
now,”
21
 while another staffer said that short titles came down to 
 
10 America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, 
Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572 (2007). 
11 Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats to 
(PROTECT) Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-401, 122 Stat. 4229 (2008). 
12 Prematurity Research Expansion and Education for Mothers who Deliver Infants 
Early (PREEMIE) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-450, 120 Stat. 3341 (2006). 
13 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity (SAFETEA) Act: A 
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). One can see from the actual 
short title, but not the acronym, that the Act has nothing to do with the tea beverage. 
14 Confidential Interviews conducted with U.S. Congressional staffers and members of 
the American media in Washington, D.C. (2009). 
15 Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 6, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 21, 2009). 
16 Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 3, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 26, 2009). 
17 Id. 
18 Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 5, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 22, 2009). 
19 Confidential Interview with Member of the Media, in the U.S. (Oct. 22, 2009). 
20 Id. 
21 Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 5, supra note 18. 
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“member style.”
22
 Thus, those close to the legislative process seemed to 
view such devices merely as branding instruments, similar to how 
products are marketed in the business world, employing witty catch-
phrases and slogans in order to tempt customers to purchase them. As 
with any branding tactic, short titles also then become powerful tools to 
sell proposed legislation. For example, who would not want to vote for 
a law that “leaves no child behind,” “saves homes,” or “protects 
consumers?”
23
 In turn, who would not want to make gains against rivals 
and defeat opposing party members who vote against, for example, 
“saving homes?”
24
 
For the purpose of the current Article, we will accept that short 
titles are a form of legislative branding, and may not necessarily be held 
to the accuracy standards of most legal and statutory language. 
Therefore, in a sense short titles are the advertising for a particular law, 
just as the branding of a product is used in the advertising for that 
product. Below, we explore what is and what is not lawful in regard to 
advertising, and specifically, deceptive advertising, in order to provide a 
rare but essential insight into the ethics of bill naming. However, to 
demonstrate the scale of the problem, this piece first delves into some 
notorious bills, their accompanying short titles, and their overall 
effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, there are many examples of problematic legislation 
(to be discussed) not fulfilling the lofty aspirations declared in the short 
title. These titles usually make heroic assumptions about what the 
proposals will accomplish, thus misleading and deceiving those who 
encounter the legislation. Legislators may vote for a proposal based in 
part on its title, particularly given the length of many proposed bills, or 
because they fear the political consequences of opposing a bill whose 
short title carries voter appeal.
25
 Similarly, members of the public likely 
 
22 Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 4, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 26, 2009). 
23 See e.g. No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 7; Helping Families Save Their Homes 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1362; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
24 Arguably, gains against rivals could potentially be achieved even if the reason 
opponents voted against the positively-sounding legislation was due to a belief that the 
proposed legislation would not in fact achieve its ‘branded’ ends. 
25 Brian Christopher Jones, Drafting Proper Short Titles: Do States Have the Answer?, 
23(2) STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455-76 (2012). (noting that politicians and staffers admit that 
short titles can affect whether or not a bill becomes a law). See also Brian Christopher 
Jones, Processes, Standards and Politics: Drafting Short Titles in the Westminster 
Parliament, Scottish Parliament and US Congress, 25(1) FLA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 
2013) (A Congressman admits that he “get[s] hurt politically” every time he votes against a 
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have even less opportunity or inclination to digest the legislation in 
depth, and yet may make election decisions based in part on how their 
representatives vote. Below are a few examples of prominent 
Congressional acts that certainly did not do what they said on the 
surface, and may be problematic from the FTC’s viewpoint. 
A. No Child Left Behind Act 2001 
With one of the most infamous bill names in recent American 
history, the No Child Left Behind Act was enacted in January 2002.
26
 
The misleading nature of the name is facially apparent: education is a 
human endeavor, and thus will never be flawless in operation. 
Therefore, to suggest that no child will be left behind because of a 
federal education policy is an outlandish and absurdly misleading 
statement. Nevertheless, it remains law, even though President Obama 
and U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan have spoken on numerous 
occasions about overhauling it.
27
 
Some may see the title as a symbolic slogan not meant to be taken 
literally, while others expressly use the title as an accepted educational 
doctrine. For example, a 2005 Department of Education report to 
Congress stresses that the law “raises expectations for States, local 
educational agencies, and schools,”
28
 and the report boldly declares that 
“[e]very child can learn. Every child must learn. And thanks to NCLB, 
every child will learn”.
29
 Thus, the inflammatory and misleading 
language throughout the report complements the title of the legislation 
as the statements located in the document traverse the barrier from 
being symbolic political rhetoric into genuine expectation. 
Not only has the lofty standard set by the title and by the enhanced 
governmental expectations failed, but the results have been 
catastrophically inadequate. For example, a 2011 report to Congress by 
 
bill with an evocative short title.). 
26 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006). 
27 Weekly Address: President Obama to Send Updated Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act Blueprint to Congress on Monday, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 13, 2010, 6:00 
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-send-
updated-elementary-and-secondary-education-act-; See also Arne Duncan, Escaping the 
constraints of “No Child Left Behind,” WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/escaping-the-constraints-of-no-child-left-
behind/2012/01/06/gIQAYmqpfP_story.html. 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ANN. REP. 1 (2005), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/nclb/nclbrpt2005.pdf (emphasis in original). 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Education Secretary Duncan, which includes the 2008-09 data, notes 
that in more than 50 percent of states, the percentage of fourth-grade 
student proficiency compared to eighth-grade proficiency was higher 
for both mathematics and reading/language arts—for mathematics this 
was true for 89 percent of states, while for reading/language arts it was 
true for 53 percent of states.
30
 And these results were observed 
approximately seven years after the Act was passed. 
An examination of state-level statistics regarding these two 
markers for high school students produced some ominous performances 
in terms of proficiency: District of Columbia (43 percent - Math); New 
Hampshire (32 percent - Math); Maine (42 percent - Math); Hawaii (34 
percent - Math); Washington (41 percent - Math); Rhode Island (27 
percent - Math); Kentucky (41 percent - Reading); California (54 
percent - Reading); Michigan (50 percent - Reading); Minnesota (41 
percent - Reading); New Mexico (35 percent - Reading).
31
 However, 
there are many examples of states doing quite well: Alabama (85 
percent - Math); Maryland (85 percent - Math); Nebraska (90 - Math); 
Virginia (91 percent - Math); New York (89 percent - Reading); South 
Carolina (87 percent - Reading); and Ohio (81 percent - Reading).
32
 The 
District of Columbia reports that at the end of the 2009-2010 school-
year only fifteen out of 195 public schools hit their “Adequate Yearly 
Progress” (AYP) goals, or 8 percent of schools.
33
 Also, many states 
remain under 50 percent in terms of science proficiency for elementary 
school, middle school and high school students.
34
 Overall, these results 
sharply contrast with expectations. While some states are doing well in 
proficiency for mathematics or reading/language, many still drastically 
under-perform, and thus do not live up to either the symbolic or literal 
essence of the law. 
This is clear evidence that over a decade after NCLB was passed, 
children are still being left behind at very high rates. But this analysis is 
not an outright condemnation of the Act itself, as surely an education 
policy that mandates many changes, and must be funded to achieve 
success, could still do so if implemented correctly. Indeed, many 
 
30 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ANN. REP. FOR SCH. YEAR 2008-09 
1, 10 (2011), available at www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/eseareport2008-2009.doc. 
31 Id. at 12. 
32 Id. 
33 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ANN. REP. FOR SCH. YEAR 2009-10 
48 (2012), available at www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/esea-report-2009-2010.doc. 
34 Id. at 25. 
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schools are improving each year.
35
 This is, however, a condemnation of 
the title of the Act. Contrary to the 2005 U.S. Department of Education 
report, the basic premise of “every child will learn”
36
 is outlandish to 
suggest, as such an outcome is plainly not feasible in any regard. At this 
point, the Act’s title would certainly fail a prima facie test on any level–
and perhaps disastrously so. 
B. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act was signed by President George 
W. Bush on September 4, 2003,
37
 and also set quite a high standard 
through its short title. Though it uses the word “elimination,” neither the 
word nor any reference to eliminating prison rape, was used in President 
Bush’s signing statement about the legislation.
38
 A 2006 statement on 
the Act by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the branch primarily 
responsible for researching the topic, did not mention “elimination” 
either; instead, the NIJ noted that the Act may “sharply reduce” 
institutional sexual violence by making the issue a “high priority.”
39
 
Even the long title of the bill, which is supposed to accurately describe 
the proposal,
40
 did not mention eliminating or even sharply reducing 
prison rape, as it states: 
An Act to provide for the analysis of the incidence and effects of 
prison rape in Federal, State, and local institutions and to provide 
 
35 ANN. REP. FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2008-09, supra note 30, at44-45, available at 
www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/eseareport2008-2009.doc. 
36 ANN. REP. 1 supra note 30, available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/nclb/nclbrpt2005.pdf. 
37 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (2003). 
38 George W. Bush, Statement on Prison Rape Elimination Act, WHITE HOUSE: 
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030904-9.html. Although he did use the 
signing statement to verify that the Executive Branch would not be handing much 
information over to the Prison Rape Commission, he noted in his second paragraph that 
“Section 7(h) of the Act purports to grant to the Commission a right of access to any Federal 
department or agency information it considers necessary to carry out its duties, and section 
7(k)(3) provides for release of information to the public. The executive branch shall 
construe sections 7(h) and 7(k)(3) in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional 
authority to withhold information when its disclosure could impair deliberative processes of 
the Executive or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties and, to the extent 
possible, in a manner consistent with Federal statutes protecting sensitive information from 
disclosure.” 
39 NIJ’s Response to the Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 
2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213137.pdf. 
40
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE, supra note 1, §32, 1(a). 
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information, resources, recommendations, and funding to protect 
individuals from prison rape.
41
 
It could be that the word was used because the primary purpose of the 
Act was to “establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of 
prison rape . . . in the United States,”
42
 a similar standard to the NCLB 
measure discussed above. 
The implications of the Act’s title are quite apparent: it seeks to 
eliminate rape in all American correctional facilities. Though not 
mentioned in the title, jails and other local and state correctional 
institutions are included.
43
 At the time of passage, Congress 
conservatively estimated
44
 that nearly 13 percent (or over 200,000) of 
current inmates had been sexually assaulted at least once, and close to 
one million inmates had been assaulted in the past twenty years.
45
 It also 
noted that juveniles housed in adult facilities are five times more likely 
to get sexually assaulted than when housed in juvenile facilities, and 
there is increased risk for sexual assault in the first forty-eight hours of a 
juvenile’s incarceration.
46
 
Though the bill had worthy aspirations, to date it has hardly 
eliminated or even “sharply reduced” sexual victimization in 
American’s prisons and jails. For example, by 2006 reports of incidents 
by correctional authorities were up from 2.46 in 2004 to 2.91 inmates 
per 1,000 inmates.
47
 The total number of allegations by correctional 
authorities in adult correctional facilities has steadily risen each year, 
from 6,241in 2005, to 6,528 in 2006
48
 to 7,374 in 2007, and 7,444 in 
2008.
49
 A 2010 report on sexual victimization in prisons estimates that 
88,500 current inmates in prisons and jails across the country had been 
sexually victimized; 4.4 percent of prison inmates and 3.1 percent of jail 
 
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2006). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 15602(1) (2006). 
43 Id. § 15601 (3). 
44 By their own admission, Id. § 15601(2). 
45 Id. § 15601 (2). 
46 Id. § 15601(4). 
47 ALLEN J. BECK, PAIGE M. HARRISON & DEVON B. ADAMS, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 218914, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY 
CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES 3 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svrca06.pdf. 
48 Id. at 2. 
49 U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234183, PREA DATA 
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 2 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2198. 
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inmates had been victimized in the past twelve months.
50
 The prison 
number seems to be holding steady, as the figure was 4.5% in 2007.
51
 
However, the most shocking numbers come from youth facilities, where 
an estimated 12 percent of youth in 2008-09 were victimized by either 
another youth or a facility staff member.
52
 
Many of the provisions of the Prison Rape Elimination Act
53
 
present genuinely purposeful efforts on the part of the government to 
reduce the phenomenon: § 15603 directs the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) to carry out annual reports on prison rape; § 15604 implements a 
National Institute of Corrections clearinghouse to provide information 
and training to correctional authorities on prison rape; § 15605 
authorizes appropriations to correctional facilities for the protection of 
inmates; § 15606 establishes the (more appropriately named) National 
Prison Rape Reduction Commission; § 15607 directs the Attorney 
General to issue national standards on prison rape reduction within one 
year after receiving the report from the Commission; and § 15608 
prohibits facilities that have not adopted the national standards from 
receiving any federal grants. 
The main question for this endeavor is why such misleading 
language was needed for a piece of legislation that was unanimously 
supported in both the House and Senate.
54
 The evidence presented above 
clearly illustrates that the Act has not even come close to “eliminating” 
sexual assault in America’s correctional facilities. If the drafters wanted 
to be more accurate with their aspirations for the bill, the more tempered 
word “reduction” could have been used (and has been used in other 
short titles,
55
 the naming of the National Prison Rape Reduction 
 
50 ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES, 
2008-09, at 5 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf. 
51 ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES, 
2007, at 2 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf. 
52 ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREA DATA 
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 2011, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca11.pdf. 
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609. 
54 Bill Summary & Status – 108th Congress (2003-2004) – S.1435 – Major 
Congressional Actions, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01435:@@@R. 
55 See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat, 2812 
(codified as 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (2006)); Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime 
Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327 (codified as amended in 
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Commission, and also by other official governmental agencies in 
reference to PREA, such as the NIJ.)
56
 By using “elimination,” Congress 
explicitly and needlessly misled those who encountered the Act, be they 
lawmakers or members of the public. Additionally, the short title sets a 
lofty standard for the bill that is likely to never be achieved, thus 
making those who enacted the measure or are working to implement the 
law look foolhardy and ineffective. 
C. Other Problematic Examples 
Other examples of problematic bill titles are easily found 
throughout history. For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984 was an omnibus measure that included many smaller acts, all 
leveled at decreasing (or “‘comprehensively controlling”) crime, and 
especially violent crime and drug crime.
57
 The smaller acts located 
inside the proposal included certain measures (among others: the Armed 
Career Criminal Act of 1984, the Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984, the Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act of 
1984, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, the National Narcotics 
Act of 1984, the Missing Children’s Act, the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, and the Victims of Crime Act of 1984.
58
 Though it was named so, 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act certainly failed to 
comprehensively control crime, and particularly violent crime, which 
rose to historically high levels in the early 1990s.
59
 Additionally, the 
percentage of drug related homicides rose to 7.4 percent in 1989, which 
was the highest level in the past twenty years.
60
 
 
 
 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
56 See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2006)); NIJ’s Response to the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 
CORR. TODAY, Feb. 2006, at 60, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213137.pdf 
(explaining that the act calls for, inter alia, standards to reduce prison rape and stating that 
the Act may help to “sharply reduce” the negative consequences of prison rape). 
57 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
58 Bill Summary & Status – 98th Congress (1983-1984) – H.J.RES.648 - Titles, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d098:HJ00648:@@@T (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2012). 
59 Key Facts At A Glance, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (last modified Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/cv2.cfm. 
60 Drug And Crime Facts, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (last modified Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/duc.cfm#drug-related. 
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Another somewhat quirky but relevant example is the Controlling 
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN SPAM) 
Act,
61
 which was passed in 2003 in an attempt to regulate commercial 
email, especially bulk email. However, as the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection points out, the Act regulates not just spam, or bulk, email, 
but all commercial email.
62
 Some insiders have dubbed this law the 
“You Can Spam Act,”
63
 as it essentially allows companies to send out 
bulk email, or spam, if it meets a certain criteria. Given the name of the 
Act, the first two criteria the law sets in place are slightly ironic: 
(1) Don’t use false or misleading header information. Your “From,” 
“To,” “Reply-To,” and routing information – including the 
originating domain name and email address – must be accurate and 
identify the person or business who initiated the message. (2) Don’t 
use deceptive subject lines. The subject line must accurately reflect 
the content of the message.
64
 
By naming the Act as if they were eliminating spam when they were 
essentially enabling it, Congress created further confusion. 
Additionally, the fact that the Act is so stringent with false or 
misleading header information and deceptive subject lines is 
preposterous given the deceptive name of the law. 
 
III. BARRIERS TO REGULATION OF SHORT BILL 
TITLES 
Lest one seem hopelessly naïve, before beginning a discussion of 
how the FTC might analyze short bill titles, it is worth discussing why 
FTC regulation of short bill titles under current law is unlikely. The 
FTC was established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
and its duties include preventing “[u]nfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce. . . .”
65
 There are two significant barriers to FTC 
enforcement against short bill titles. First, the FTC has jurisdiction only 
over commercial advertising and regulation of non-commercial speech, 
 
61 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, supra note 4. 
62 The CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N. Sept. 
2009), http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus61-can-spam-act-compliance-guide-business. 
63 See Amit Asaravala, With This Law, You Can Spam, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2004), 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/01/62020. 
64 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 62. 
65 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2006). 
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such as political speech, which might raise First Amendment issues. 
Second, the FTC has been reluctant to take action against product brand 
names as opposed to product claims. We discuss each below. 
Speech, in its many forms, is protected in the United States under 
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has long held that 
noncommercial speech – speech that does not relate to a commercial 
transaction – is subject generally only to “reasonable time, place and 
manner” restrictions and is virtually immune from content restriction – 
with, for example, “yelling fire in a crowded theatre” and the 
notoriously difficult to prove libel standard being two of the better 
known exceptions.
66
 Commercial speech, however, is entitled to less 
constitutional protection, as Justice Stevens writes, “few of us would 
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizens right to 
see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our 
choice.”
67
 The Supreme Court, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp.
68
 established a four-pronged test for determining whether the 
speech at issue was commercial. These prongs are whether the speech: 
 Proposes a commercial transaction 
 Refers to a specific product 
 Has an economic motivation; or 
 Is otherwise conceded by the defendant to be an 
advertisement. 
However, all four elements need not be present in order for the speech 
to be classified as commercial.
69
 
Consistent with this Supreme Court precedent, the FTC has long 
held that its jurisdiction over false or misleading practices is confined to 
commercial speech. In the “Mr. Fit” case
70
 the FTC challenged an 
advertisement by the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJR”). In the 
advertisement, RJR published the results of a recent lifestyle health 
study which followed the residents of Framingham, Massachusetts, over 
the course of many years.  According to RJR, the study purported to 
cast doubt on the alleged link between smoking and heart disease.
71
 The 
 
66 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
67 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
68 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
69 See Id. at 68 n.14 (“nor do we mean to suggest that each of the characteristics present 
in this case must necessarily be present in order for speech to be commercial”). 
70 In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 FTC 539 (Fed. Trade Comm’n. 1988) (Mr. Fit 
refers to the name of the study – “Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial.”). 
71 Id. at 540. 
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FTC filed an administrative complaint, claiming that the advertisement 
was false and misleading.
72
 RJR defended by claiming that the speech 
was on a matter of public interest and was noncommercial speech 
protected under the First Amendment.
73
 In a lengthy opinion, the FTC 
overturned the initial decision of the administrative law judge granting 
RJR’s Motion to Dismiss and found that, accepting the allegations of 
the complaint as true, the speech was, in fact, commercial, relying upon 
the fact that the advertisement referred to a specific product, discussed a 
specific product attribute (safety of the product), that it was 
disseminated through a payment and that RJR had a direct sales-related 
motive for disseminating the advertisement.
74
 
More recently, it appears that as consumers become increasingly 
concerned about the social responsibility of companies that they 
financially support, an increasing amount of companies have engaged in 
corporate image advertising—touting, among other things, their 
commitment to the environment, further blurring the lines between 
commercial and fully protected speech. For example, in response, at 
least one FTC Commissioner has suggested that the Commission lacks 
jurisdiction over these ads as noncommercial speech.
75
 
So where does this leave short bill titles? Clearly, they are not 
traditional commercial speech where a company seeks to sell a product 
or service to a customer.
76
 There is, of course, some element of 
commerce involved. Some legislation, such as the NAFTA 
Implementation Act,
77
 regulates commercial transactions. In addition, 
the passage or support of legislation can be a powerful fund-raising tool 
which, like a commercial transaction, takes money directly out of the 
pockets of consumers or corporations and thus relates to commerce. 
However, the same could be said for many charities or other non-
profits, whose speech would almost certainly be entitled to full First 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 541. 
74 Id. at 547. 
75 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks before the NAD Annual 
Conference 2008: What’s New in Comparative Advertising, Claim Support and Self-
Regulation, at 6 (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080923Rosch-
NADSpeech.pdf. 
76 See Bolger, 463 U.S. 66 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)) (“core notion” of commercial 
speech is proposing a commercial transaction.). 
77 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation (NAFTA) Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). 
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Amendment protection. Other indicia of commercial speech, such as the 
proposition of a commercial transaction and a reference to a product are 
also missing. In summary, even if the FTC sought to assert jurisdiction 
over short bill titles, it seems unlikely that it could do so 
constitutionally.
78
 
The second issue relates to the FTC’s (and federal courts’) 
reluctance to regulate product names as opposed to product claims. In 
other words, the titles of bills would not typically be regulated; rather, 
the FTC and courts would look more toward what people said about the 
bills. This reluctance stems in part from the tremendous good will and 
intellectual property protection often associated with trade names.
79
 As a 
result, in the famous “Aspercreme” case
80
 the FTC found that 
advertisements for Aspercreme were misleading because they implied 
that the product contained aspirin. Although the FTC did not enjoin use 
of the name, it did require that a disclaimer appear stating that the 
product did not contain aspirin.
81
 In addition, because product 
advertising is so commonplace, ensuring that claims in advertising are 
truthful likely more than compensates for, and perhaps helps clarify, 
any misperceptions that may derive from a product’s name.
82
 
In the context of legislation, regulating the name of a bill’s short 
title seems less daunting than doing the same for a product. First, there 
is not the same financial investment in good will and intellectual 
property protection for a bill; however, it may be the case that people 
have become familiar with a particular title so there is at least some 
 
78 However, legislation was recently introduced that seeks to regulate political speech. 
A hearing on S. 1994, the Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 
2011, was held on June 26, 2012 in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill “amends the 
Revised Statutes and federal criminal law to prohibit any person, whether acting under color 
of law or otherwise, from knowingly misleading voters regarding: (1) the time or place of 
holding any federal election, (2) the qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility for 
any such election, or (3) an endorsement,” and, among other things, would establish a 
private right of action for any person affected by such deception. Summary of Deceptive 
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2011, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01994:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2012). However, S. 1994 has not traveled any further in the legislative process, and 
the bill seems likely never to make it out of the committee stage and might well be held 
unconstitutional were it ever to become law. 
79 See Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933) (reasoning 
that trademarks constitute valuable assets and their destruction should not be ordered if the 
same result can be achieved through less drastic means). 
80 In re Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 1984). 
81 Id. at 842-843. 
82 See Id. § 5, ¶ 3,103. 
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potential for confusion if a short title were changed.
83
 Second, the use of 
disclaimers do not appear to be particularly helpful for bills, especially 
because short titles are most frequently mentioned in the press, and 
because they have long titles, which typically describe the function of 
the bills in more detail. It is difficult to imagine the New York Times 
reporting on the No Child Left Behind Act and noting in a disclaimer 
that “some children will actually be left behind,” nor would there be any 
means of requiring it. Finally, and most importantly, in many cases the 
short bill title is the “claim” (e.g. the elimination of prison rape, or the 
comprehensive control of crime).
84
 There is not a widespread advertising 
claim associated with particular legislation that might help clarify what 
would otherwise be a deceptive title. However, the deceptive 
advertising standards developed by the FTC are discussed in detail 
below. In summary, the FTC’s traditional reluctance to order trade 
name deletion seems less likely under the second issue.
85
 
IV. WHICH FTC STANDARDS ARE APPLICABLE? 
A. FTC Policy Statement on Deception 
In 1983, following numerous Commission and court decisions, the 
FTC took the view that nowhere was there “a single definitive statement 
of the Commission’s view of its authority” in terms of deception, and 
thus issued such a policy statement.
86
 In defining deception that is 
legally actionable, the FTC included three requirements, as outlined by 
the sub-heading sections of the policy statement: 
 
 
 
83 However, short bill titles often change when travelling between the House and 
Senate. Also, all bills originating in Congress receive an official number, and thus a change 
in the short title would be easily noted if an individual could locate the bill number. 
84 See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C.A. § 15601. 
85 There is also the issue of the speech and debate clause. Traditionally the speech and 
debate clause provides immunity for statements made on the floor of the House or the 
Senate. This would presumably extend to the names given to legislation. However, the 
constitutional protection of the speech and debate clause has been held not to extend to 
congressional press releases. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (U.S. 1979). 
Such releases are fairly commonplace with regard to legislation and would invariably 
include the short bill title. Thus, under Hutchinson they may be challengeable. 
86 Letter from James C. Miller, Chairman, FTC, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, (Oct. 14, 1983), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) 
[hereinafter FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception]. 
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 There Must Be A Representation, Omission, Or Practice 
That Is Likely To Mislead The Consumer; 
 The Act Or Practice Must Be Considered From The 
Perspective Of The Reasonable Consumer; and 
 The Representation, Omission Or Practice Must Be 
Material.
87
 
These requirements shall now be analyzed. 
In explaining the first element, the FTC notes that “the issue is 
whether the act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it 
causes actual deceptions.”
88
 In one case, a product erroneously conveyed 
that it was proven to be superior to other products, a statement that the 
FTC subsequently regarded as deceptive.
89
 In reaching this decision, the 
FTC noted that “the important consideration is the net impression 
conveyed to the public.”
90
 The fact that an omission occurred does not 
mean that the FTC is obligated to pursue a claim, as sometimes there 
must be specific evidence on consumer expectations; if this is not 
available, then the FTC may not pursue the case.
91
 For example, bait-
and-switch offers may be invalid based on whether there was a bona 
fide offer,
92
 an implication that a product is fit for the purposes that it is 
being sold,
93
 or concerns when marketing inaccurate or incomplete 
information.
94
 Under this standard, short titles are likely representations 
that at least have the potential to mislead voters and elected officials as 
to the purpose and effect of the legislation. 
The second requirement is that the act or practice must be 
considered from the perspective of the reasonable consumer. The FTC 
states that “a material practice that misleads a significant minority of 
reasonable consumers is deceptive,”
95
 and that “the Commission 
considers the totality of the practice in determining how reasonable 
consumers are likely to respond.”
96
 The FTC notes, however, that 
companies are not responsible for every outlandish response a particular 
 
87 Id. at pts. 2, 3, 4. 
88 Id. at pt. 2, para.1. 
89 Id. at n.7 (citing In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 374 (1981), aff’d, 695 
F.2d 681, 688 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at n.13 (citing Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 626 (1976)). 
92 FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception. pt. 2, para. 5. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at n.20. 
96 Id. at pt. 3, para. 1. 
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advertisement may provoke, and that there are always likely to be a 
select few who misunderstand even a reasonable representation.
97
 The 
FTC also notes that when “determining the meaning of an 
advertisement, a piece of promotional material or a sales presentation, 
the important criterion is the net impression that it is likely to make on 
the general populace.”
98
 However, the FTC states that if advertisements 
are addressed to particular groups in society (i.e. children or elderly, 
etc.), then the test of whether an advertisement is deceptive is judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable member of that group.
99
 Perhaps 
most appropriate to short bill titles, the FTC states that “depending on 
the circumstances, accurate information in the text may not remedy a 
false headline because reasonable consumers may glance only at the 
headline.”
100
 False headlines can be remedied in the body of the text or 
in the fine print, but there are exceptions depending on how outlandish 
the headline is.
101
 
Interestingly, the FTC “generally will not bring advertising cases 
based on subjective claims (taste, feel, appearance, smell) or on 
correctly stated opinion claims.”
102
 Most tendentious short titles produce 
claims that are neither subjective nor opinion-based (i.e. eliminating 
prison rape or comprehensively controlling crime). Additionally, it 
points out that “obviously exaggerated or puffing representations” 
usually are not pursued.
103
 Yet the FTC does add a caveat, noting that if 
consumers believe the claims to be real, then they indeed are 
actionable.
104
 The FTC asserts that it evaluates claims very closely 
before proceeding, and that normal market rules (i.e. sellers wanting 
repeat customers) often discourages deceptive practices.
105
 Outrageous 
 
97 Id. at pt. 3, para. 2; see also Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963). 
98 FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception, at pt. 3, para. 4. 
99 Id. at pt. 3, para. 5. 
100 Id. at pt. 3, para 11. (emphasis added); see also In re Litton Indus.,Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1, 
71 n.6 (1981), aff’d as modified, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating disclosures presented 
in fine print were not sufficient to remedy a deceptive headline). 
101 Id. at pt. 3, para. 10-11 (citing In re Giant Food, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 326, 348 (1962) 
(stating disclaimers contained in fine print may fail to correct a wrong impression which is 
deceptive as those reading ads may not take time to read them); cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 
542 F.2d 611, 618 (3d Cir. 1976) (reversing FTC Commission’s finding that deception 
resulting from a slogan used by a company could not be remedied with any qualifying 
language)). 
102 Id. at pt. 3, para. 13. 
103 FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception, at pt. 3, para. 14. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at pt. 3 para. 16. 
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claims made in short titles which have not fulfilled their lofty promises 
(see above) have not encouraged lawmakers to temper the language in 
such titles. Thus, congressional short titles have only become more 
outlandish throughout the years. 
The third element is that “representation, omission or practice must 
be a material one for deception to occur.”
106
 To explain this standard, the 
FTC notes that “a ‘material’ misrepresentation or practice is one which 
is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a 
product. If inaccurate or omitted information is material, injury is likely 
to be found.”
107
 In other words, material information is of the type that is 
important to consumers. 
In terms of the legislative process, the main material 
misrepresentation or practice would likely originate from those voting 
for such measures: whether a particular title would make lawmakers 
support or oppose a bill, either because they do not take the time to fully 
digest and understand the text of the bill, or because they have done so 
but fear the political consequences of opposing it.
108
 The FTC does note 
that “[d]epending on the facts, information pertaining to the central 
characteristics of the product or service will be presumed material,” 
including the “safety” or “efficacy” of said products.
109
 This could have 
significant implications for many short titles which advocate that they 
are “effective”, “efficient,” and “responsible” or attempt to prescribe 
“protection” of certain groups or “prevention” of certain offenses.
110
 
Indeed, it was already revealed in an earlier article by Jones that a 
majority of interviewees believed short bill titles affected a measure’s 
chances of becoming law.
111
 When examining legislation, others could 
 
106 Id. at pt. 4, para. 1. 
107 Id. at pt. 2, para. 5. (citing In re Volkswagen of Am., 99 F.T.C. 446 (1982); Fedearl 
Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934). 
108 Jones, supra note 25 (noting how one lawmaker explains that he “get[s] hurt 
politically” every time he votes against a law with an evocative, popular title). 
109 FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception, at pt. 4, para. 3 (citing In re Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 456 (1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re J.B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 546 (1965), aff’d, 381 
F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967)). 
110 See, e.g., Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
358, 122 Stat. 4001; Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144; Judicial Disclosure Responsibility 
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-24, 121 Stat. 100; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558; Joshua Omvig Veterans Suicide Prevention 
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-110, 121 Stat. 1031. 
111 See Jones, supra note 25. 
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also have material grounds against misleading or deceptive bill titles. 
Special interest groups, NGOs, journalists, and most importantly, 
voters, all have an interest in such matters. Such groups or individuals 
may decide to support or oppose a particular law because of claims 
made in short bill titles, particularly claims to protect children, prevent 
certain offenses, halt spam from entering email inboxes, and 
comprehensively control crime, as these are honorable goals. Many of 
these laws are championed on campaign trails to demonstrate to voters 
that they have been working on societal problems, or conversely, to 
demonstrate that certain individuals did not support a particular law.
112
 If 
these short bill titles are misleading or deceptive, as to misrepresent the 
laws, then these short bill titles are material, because they falsely 
express what the law actually intends to do and/or did. 
B. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising 
Almost ten years after their policy statement on deception, the FTC 
issued a complimentary “Enforcement Policy Statement on Food 
Advertising,” which focused on the nutrient and health content claims 
of foods.
113
 The Commission notes that this statement also 
complemented the Nutrition and Labeling Education Act of 1990 
(“NLEA”)
114
 and the subsequent Food and Drug Administration’s 
(“FDA”) food labeling regulations in accordance with the NLEA.
115
 As 
previously discussed, short bill titles are often claims in themselves, as 
they purport to contain certain characteristics (i.e. responsibility, 
accountability, etc.), or they express certain actions the legislation is 
going to accomplish (i.e. the protection of certain people or prevention 
or elimination of certain activities). Indeed, as noted above, many of 
these explicit and implied claims never come close to fruition. By 
analyzing the FTC’s policy statement on food advertising, a better 
understanding is developed of whether the claims made on the short 
 
112 OBAMA/BIDEN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, www.barackobama.com. Though it is also 
coined “Obamacare” the President’s official campaign website repeatedly talks about the 
Affordable Care Act. Issues – Healthcare – Barack Obama, 
http://www.barackobama.com/health-care?source=primary-nav. Also, the website 
disparages the No Child Left Behind law. Issues – Healthcare – Barack Obama, 
http://www.barackobama.com/education?source=primary-nav. 
113 FED. TRADE COMM’N. ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON FOOD ADVERTISING 
(1994), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.shtm#3. 
114 Nutrition Labeling Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 
(1990). 
115 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 101.13. 
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titles of bills would pass an FTC deception analysis. 
In deciding whether a food advertisement is deceptive, the FTC 
first looks at both the express and implied claims contained within the 
advertisement, both of which are important for short titles .
116
 Express 
claims are perhaps most relevant to short bill titles, as “an express claim 
directly makes a representation.”
117
 Tendentious and misleading bill 
titles often do this: to use an example from above, the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act states that prison rape will be eliminated with passage 
of the Act. Thus, if certain express claims are being made in short titles 
rather than describing the legislation in question, they would be subject 
to an FTC deception analysis, consisting of the factors listed in the 
above deception policy statement. The FTC also notes that omitting 
certain material statements may be deceptive and that “deception can 
occur through omission of information that is necessary to prevent an 
affirmative representation from being misleading.”
118
 
Short titles tend to make heroic claims without mentioning that 
such claims are aspirational. The Prison Rape Elimination Act example 
used above is a good test case for this standard. If the title read 
“Examining Prison Rape to Enhance Inmate Protection Act,” it may 
well have passed a deceptive analysis test, as the title fully 
acknowledges the aspirational essence of the legislation. However, the 
simple title “Prison Rape Elimination Act” expressly states that prison 
rape will be eliminated with passage of the Act, without noting the 
legislation’s aspirational character. Conversely, a properly labeled 
example is the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act.
119
 Though the bill was controversial, the short title is descriptive 
and expresses the main objective of the Act in a reasonable manner. 
The FTC also notes that objective claims should be supported by 
valid evidence, stating that it is deceptive “to make an express or 
implied nutrition or health benefit claim for a food unless, at the time 
the claim is made, the advertiser possesses and relies upon a reasonable 
basis substantiating the claim.”
120
 A reasonable basis claim is usually 
 
116 FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, “Legal Framework for 
Commission” at para. 3. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at para.4. 
119 NAFTA, supra note 77. 
120 FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, para. 5 (citing In re 
Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. at 839). 
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supported by competent and reliable evidence,
121
 which the FTC has 
more thoroughly described as, 
tests, analyses, research, studies or other evidence based on the 
expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that have been 
conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified 
to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession to 
yield accurate and reliable results.
122
 
Congressional bills are not subject to any reasonable basis standard; this 
is true even when short titles express outlandish claims, such as the 
elimination of prison rape with overcrowded prisons and over two 
million people behind bars, or the canning of spam in a digital age that 
thrives on email and Internet marketing. 
C. Kraft, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kraft, Inc. v. 
Federal Trade Commission is meaningful because it relies on many 
anti-trust, trade and constitutional law factors to determine whether the 
advertising in question was indeed deceptive. It stands as the barometer 
by which advertisements are judged for actionable causes by the FTC. It 
also describes how the FTC should go about deeming an advertisement 
deceptive, explains why misleading commercial speech is not protected 
under the Constitution, and renders what is material in such cases.
123
 
These areas will be analyzed in turn. 
First, the court reiterated the premise of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission Act, which “makes it unlawful to engage in unfair or 
deceptive commercial practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45, or to induce consumers 
to purchase certain products through advertising that is misleading in a 
material respect,” and acknowledged that the FTC is given the authority 
to regulate such matters.
124
 The Kraft decision also noted that, 
In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
125
 the Supreme Court held that 
while the words “deceptive advertising” set forth a legal standard 
that derives its final meaning from judicial construction, an FTC 
 
121 FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, para. 6 (noting that the 
“substantiation must also be examined in the context of the entire body of relevant evidence, 
particularly if it produces results that are contrary to that body of evidence.”). 
122 FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, pt. 4(A), para. 5 (citing 
Gracewood Fruit Co., FTC No. C-3470 (Oct. 29, 1993) (consent order); Pompeian, Inc., 
FTC No. C-3402 (Oct. 27, 1992) (consent order)). 
123 Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992). 
124 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 55). 
125 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965). 
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finding is “to be given great weight by reviewing courts” because it 
“rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic judgment” and in light 
of the frequency with which the Commission handles these cases.
126
 
Furthermore, in terms of facial validity regarding deceptive advertising, 
the FTC can rely on its own judgment in terms of what cases to pursue, 
and does not have to conduct surveys in order to determine that a 
commercial has a tendency to mislead.
127
 
Next, when discussing commercial speech, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has recognized that while commercial speech is protected by the 
United States Constitution, “false, deceptive, or misleading advertising” 
does not serve the public interest and thus “remains subject to 
restraint.”
128
 Further, the Kraft court recognized that “Kraft’s [F]irst 
[A]mendment challenge is doomed by the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Zauderer [v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio], 
which established that no [F]irst [A]mendment concerns are raised 
when facially apparent implied claims are found without resort to 
extrinsic evidence.”
129
 Reminiscent of the problematic bill title 
examples, were it not for the fact that, as discussed above, they may be 
deemed non-commercial speech, these facially apparent implied claims 
would likely fall within the ambit of Zauderer. The court further noted 
that “commercial speech is less susceptible to the chilling effect of 
regulation than other, more traditionally recognized forms of speech, 
such as political discourse,” primarily because it is motivated by 
profit.
130
 
Finally, in regard to materiality, the court noted that “[a] claim is 
considered material if it ‘involves information that is important to 
consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct 
regarding a product.’”
131
 The Commission is entitled to apply, within 
reason, a presumption of materiality,
132
 and it does so with three types of 
claims: 
 
126 Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 316 (citing Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 385). 
127 Id. at 319 (citing Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 392). 
128 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982). 
129 Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 321 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985)). 
130 Id. (relying on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 
(1984)). 
131 Id. at 322 (citing In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 
1984); FTC Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 175, 182) (as appended to In re Cliffdale 
Assocs.). 
132 Id. (citing Colgate-Palmolive, Co., 380 U.S. at 392). 
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(1) express claims; 
(2) implied claims where there is evidence that the seller intended to 
make the claim; and 
(3) claims that significantly involve health, safety, or other areas 
with which reasonable consumers would be concerned.
133
 
Notably, the court recognizes the FTC’s guidance that a claim is 
material if it is “likely to affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with 
regard to a product.”
134
 
However, the court also notes that “restrictions on potentially 
misleading speech, by contrast, can be no ‘broader than reasonably 
necessary to prevent the [deception]’ and may not categorically prohibit 
such speech if less restrictive alternatives are available.”
135
 This seems 
like a healthy modern standard, especially when it comes to the titles of 
bills. It would be one thing to restrict the historically interesting and 
wildly imaginative art of political sloganeering, but it is quite another to 
deceptively label a proposed bill as effective; protective of a certain 
segment of society; or suggesting marked improvement in a policy area, 
simply because a lawmaker wants the bill to pass and become law. 
The title of this Article asks whether congressional short titles 
would survive FTC scrutiny. As seen above, if many of these titles were 
conceptualized as branding under advertising principles, they would be 
subject to a long list of rules and regulations established under both case 
law and FTC deceptive practice principles. Many congressional bill 
titles in the United States would likely be subject to legal action, as they 
qualify under all three elements. Also, the bills would meet the 
requirements of material grounds set forth at both the legislative and the 
general public or societal levels. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An interesting FTC Business Guide Alert came in October of 2001, 
shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
136
 It noted that after the attacks, 
“consumers are more sensitive to ‘Made in USA’ claims and more 
 
133 Id. (citing In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 816-17 (1984); FTC Policy 
Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 182-83 (as appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs.). 
134 Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 323-4 (citing FTC Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 175) (as 
appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs.). 
135 Id. at 107-108 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203). 
136 FTC, BUSINESS ALERT: SELLING ‘AMERICAN MADE’ PRODUCTS? WHAT BUSINESSES 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT MAKING MADE IN USA CLAIMS, (2001), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt101.pdf . 
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interested in buying American-made goods.”
137
 The alert mainly 
reminded businesses of the FTC’s “all or virtually all” standard
138
 and 
provided links to relevant websites for more information. But while 
companies and products were rigorously subjected to the FTC standard, 
that same month Congress was busy
139
 enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, 
whose name was not subject to any standard whatsoever — not even a 
qualifying one.
140
 
Although the Act contained many contentious measures related to 
civil liberties, some of which were challenged in court,
141
 Congress was 
allowed to unequivocally stamp the measure as inherently American by 
using “USA” in the title, and also deem it “patriotic,” thus inscribing the 
choice of controversial evocative wording into the statute books. It 
seems noticeably ironic and deeply incongruous that products in the 
USA are so heavily regulated that consumer watchdog agencies, such as 
the FTC, strictly enforce “Made in the USA” labeling restrictions – 
even on small, harmless products –
142
 but a massive federal law that 
affects millions of citizens and a wide range of governmental operations 
is not subject to any type of binding constitutional regulation as to how 
it is officially labeled. 
Similar to how there is no particular “bright line” test for a “Made 
in the USA” label for products, there is no corresponding rule for 
misleading, tendentious, and/or evocative short titles. Given the current 
state of tendentious and, at times, outlandish congressional short titles, it 
seems that some standard must be implemented to which such titles 
should strive to achieve. Yet in this regard, the United States federal 
 
137 Id. 
138 FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON U.S. ORIGIN CLAIMS (1997), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/12/epsmadeusa.htm (“A product that is all or virtually all made 
in the United States will ordinarily be one in which all significant parts and processing that 
go into the product are of U.S. origin.”). 
139 Well, maybe they were not all too busy.  The bill was introduced in the House on 
October 23rd and passed on the 24th. The bill then passed the Senate on the 25th, and was 
sent to the President that same day. See Bill Summary & Statutes, Major Congressional 
Actions, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001-2001), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03162:@@@R (see the congressional timeline for the bill in the 
section entitled, “Major Actions.”). 
140 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2. 
141 Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Doe 
v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
142 See Press Release, FTC, Wire Manufacturer and its Distributor and a Cosmetics Co. 
Agree to Settle Charges of Making Misleading “Made in the USA” Claims (Sept. 13, 1999) 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/09/wirephysform.shtm. 
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government has failed mightily. Is it not a tautology that the 
governments and institutions that regulate deceptive advertising must 
hold themselves accountable to the same standards by which they judge 
others? We believe this proposition to be highly equitable. 
Eventually, it must be determined what legal status legislative 
short titles possess in Congress. Either they represent the full force of 
law that they are usually inscribed with in the congressional record, and 
thus should be subject to the technical accuracy and formal, descriptive 
language of the law; or, as many of the above interviewees suggested, 
and which this article has taken into consideration, they are branding 
elements, and therefore should be subject to a form of regulations 
similar to those governing deceptive advertising practices. While the 
First Amendment may make it difficult for the FTC to exert jurisdiction 
over such matters, some form of scrutiny could still be adopted. For 
example, review and approval by a bipartisan committee or watchdog 
group should be considered. If it is determined that short titles are part 
of the traditionally legal aspects of legislation, then such titles need 
rules and recommendations as to what are proper and improper short 
titles, and these must be defined in either the congressional rules, and/or 
through other legal devices, such as official acts. If it is determined that 
short titles are ‘branding’ instruments, then such titles should 
unequivocally not appear on official documents as they are traveling 
through the legislative process or after they are enacted, and should be 
subjected to the same deceptive advertising standards by which most 
every other entity is governed. 
 
